

Greek White Book Reveals Ex-Queen Sophie as Leader In Pro-German War Intrigue

Messages in Secret Code Show Ex-Kaiser's Sister Sought to Hand Greece Over to Prussianism and Her King, Constantine, Was a Willing Accomplice



EX-KAISER WILHELM

THE Aukland stable of Europe has been swept clean by the war. The constellation of Germanophile kings of which the Kaiser was the greatest star, forming a date apart, intermarrying only among themselves and looked up to with a mystical awe by the unthinking, has gone. Hohenzollern and Hapsburg, Góburg and Romanoff, with their court centred diplomacies, their marriages, funerals, christenings, coronations and jubilees, which were matters of almost universal worship and seemed to explain the very existence of mankind, have been driven into exile and mankind hardly misses them. We remember the uninvited guest at Amersongen and the harmless Charles of Hapsburg at Wartegg in Switzerland, and the deposed Constantine of Greece and his Queen Sophie, who called Venizelos "the Cretan Boor" and "interloper" and referred to him as "one of the little lawyers of Athens."

Now that we look back it does seem preposterous to think that making a man a king could change his nationality or that marrying a princess should break her family ties. Now that we look back it does seem preposterous that a nation should be handed over like a piece of real estate to a man or a family whose loyalties were elsewhere. The story of Greece during the war is a proof of this, and the documents in the "Greek White Book," covering the period of 1913-17, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Greek Government and now published by the American Hellenic Society, confirm what the world already suspected: that Queen Sophie, sister of Kaiser Wilhelm, was the dominating figure of pro-German intrigue at Athens during the war and that, whatever their domestic relations may have been, her husband, Constantine, was her only too willing accomplice.

"Among the people we shall always continue to work in favor of Germany against our enemies," she wirelessed in secret code to the Kaiser January 10, 1917. "May the infamous pigs receive the punishment which they deserve," was her message on January 24. "From your isolated and afflicted sister." Again on January 10: "I hope you will not lose sight of the fact that Greece, in pursuit of light, is united by railway, could, on account of her geographical position, become a useful and precious aid to our beloved fatherland."

High Time They Lost Throne. When a constitutional king and his queen resort to the use of a secret code for political intrigue at a time when the fate of their people is at stake they become a menace and their removal a right to be insisted on by the free people of the world. It was high time to dethrone Constantine.

The documents in this new Greek White Book deal with the Greco-Serbian treaty and the Germano-Bulgarian invasion of Macedonia, and contain certain telegrams exchanged in cipher between the courts of Athens and Berlin. The despatches in cipher were decoded and submitted in 1917 to the Greek Parliamentary Commission, acting as Public Prosecutor before the High Court constituted to try the members of the Skouloudis and Lambrinos Ministries who had kept Greece from fulfilling her obligations to Serbia and who had encouraged hostilities to the Entente Allies. The basis of the cryptographic system-made use of by the King and Queen was a French ciphered dictionary dated 1884, one copy of which was in possession of Mr. N. Theotoky, Greek Minister in Berlin, who acted as receiving agent of the King and Queen, without the knowledge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The wireless correspondence was carried on from the radio station at Athens to that at Sophia, which transmitted the messages to Berlin, vice versa. Cabled messages were sent to the Greek Ministers at Berlin or Rome, who were instructed to send them on to the Greek Minister in Berlin. The cipher messages that have been discovered bear the name of the Foreign Minister of the period, but it is not clear that he was aware of their contents. The ciphering work at Athens seems to have been entirely in the hands of another Mr. Theotoky, master of ceremonies at the Court of Queen Sophie and closely related to, if not a brother of, the Minister in Berlin.

Discovery of Code an Accident.

The discovery of the secret code was accidental. A cipher message was sent January 5, 1916, by Theotoky in Berlin to King Constantine, containing the text of a letter from the S. Bleichroeder bank of Berlin to the National Bank of Greece and a translation of this message was found in the files of the National Bank, while the text in cipher of the wireless original was found in the registry book of the radio station at Athens. Justification of the words and ciphers led to the discovery of the code and to the reading of most of the messages.

Translation of the letter of the S. Bleichroeder Bank:

Berlin, Jan. 5, 1916. (To the) National Bank of Greece, Athens:

I confirm by the present that I am opening for you a credit of forty millions of marks under the following conditions:

You are authorized either to have a credit in my bank at your disposal or to draw on me by quarterly drafts up to the full total of the above amount.

For the credit at your disposal you will allow me a net 6 per cent. interest annually; for the drafts five-eighths per cent. commission quarterly.

I bind myself to renew the drafts every three months, [the payment] to be made three months after the conclusion of peace.

You will keep on file the draft wired on me.

Please confirm the above.

Believe me, gentlemen,

Yours most sincerely,

S. BLEICHROEDER.

The Pre-War Period.

The new Greek White Book naturally divides itself into three sections:

1. Documents dealing with the pre-war period, when Streit was Greek Foreign Minister and, with the approval of King Constantine, sounded out the policy of Serbia in case of trouble between Greece and Turkey over the massacre and exile of Greeks in the Sultan's dominions. "In case Bulgaria should participate in the war or refuse to defend its neutrality, we would invoke the cause of federalism," wrote Streit to Belgrade on

June 12, three weeks before the Sarajevo murder. Serbia's reply, dated June 16, is loyal and frank and goes to show how little the Government of Belgrade was thinking of war at that time:

"The Serbian Government begs to express the desire that the question of the persecutions of the Greeks in Turkey may be settled peacefully through the intervention of the Great Powers who have assumed the obligation of protecting the Christians in Turkey. Consequently, it desires that an armed conflict be avoided for the following reasons that are decisive according to its point of view:

"1st. The Serbian Government has not been able, up to the present time, to complete its armament, the larger part of which was rendered useless or was destroyed in the two wars. It is particularly in need of rifles and ammunition.

"2d. Serbia also lacks financial means. Its finances are exhausted. All credit is refused to her and she cannot count on a loan abroad. During these last six months she has made great efforts in order to secure a loan for a short term, agreeing even to issue Government bonds, but to no purpose, inasmuch as she has already obtained one which, although now exhausted, has not been sufficient to meet her previous obligations.

"3d. The Serbian people, and that means the army, is weakened and worn out; it is consequently unable to enter into a new war.


"4th. Bulgaria is at present better prepared for the war than she was when she attacked us. Aus-

tria has secretly supplied her, from her own depots, a sufficient quantity of new rifles and ammunition, and a large number of guns with the necessary ammunition. This makes one think that Bulgaria wishes war as soon as possible in order to take revenge for recent events."

Serbia Stoutly Loyal.

Nevertheless, Serbia took steps to support Greece in Constantinople and called on Turkey "to put a stop to this intolerable state of affairs." When the Grand Vizier replied that he did not see how that which took place in Asia Minor touched Serbia, Serbia's answer was "that whatever touched Greece touched also Serbia in her character of ally." A loyal stand which won for Minister Streit in Athens the thanks of King Constantine's Government "for a step which has once more proved the strength of our alliance and the friendly bonds which unite the two peoples."

Who could have thought that within six weeks that same King of Greece would have weakened the strength of the alliance and been deaf to Serbia's appeal for help when Austria thundered at her door? No wonder Venizelos was indignant and Belgrade against. When Venizelos resigned September 7, 1915, he reminded the King of these things and pointed out the danger of composing the cause of Greece's natural enemies. "We do not escape the war, we simply postpone it, and that for no long time," he wrote to the King. "Why should we be so obliging toward a Power which seeks by every means to help the principal enemies of Hellenism, namely the Bulgarians and the Turks, and why show such indifference toward the Powers which, after having created and under all circumstances protected Greece, are still disposed to-day to side with us?"



KEY TO DISCOVERY OF CODE
PREMIER VENIZELLOS OF GREECE

COMMUNIQUÉ									
adresses	par	Bl	cl	ch	re	ed	er	a la	
49078	9031	192	252	184	506	288	201	6225	
Banque Nationale de Grèce									
5220		9745	3417	[1]	8150	7766	0980		
communication									
6829	8098	7434	6225		3220		9745		
se transmettre									
500	1860		3042		3348			31	3261
To cinq									
6202	0071	2435		1916	A la	Banque Nationale de Grèce			
Athènes									
2278	stop	3417	33480	6256	2017	3809	3417	0884	
un crédit									
4097	8727	0090	5362	48262	25482	9533	7497		
sont suivantes									
70025	87	874	94008	931	0690		8981		
dise									
420	931	0900	5031	7084	1460	9031	80692	18905	



EX-KING CONSTANTINE OF GREECE



CHARLES JONNART

2. The second part deals with the arrangements for the evacuation of Greek Macedonia and the surrender to the German-Bulgarian forces of the arms, munitions and supplies at Port Roupel.

3. The third part reveals the wily manoeuvres of Constantine and Sophie to supply information to Berlin, to outwit the Entente and to use the Greek army to aid the Germans against Salonica.

"The intervention of Tino with his principal forces operating against the west wing of Sarraïl will bring the decision in Macedonia. Up to the present God has helped me. I am thinking constantly of you and Tino," the Kaiser had wirelessed through Theotoky in Berlin to his sister, December 18, 1916. Having consulted some expert on strategy, Sophie replied, sending a thousand greetings and adding, "The issue that you advise would be the only one possible if Sarraïl, attacked by you, should be obliged to retreat; in which case his left wing would penetrate close to the parts of Greece occupied by us. As things are now, since the distance separating this wing from us is very great, the line of our communications would be too much exposed and our stocks of food and munitions would not be sufficient for the long struggle. Under these circumstances, a decisive and prompt attack on your part, if it is possible, would give to Greece militarily the opportunity to intervene."

Hindenburg Was Not Ready.

Pressure was brought to bear in Berlin, Zimmermann was appealed to, a Crown Council was held; but Hindenburg was not ready to attack at Salonica and Queen Sophie is desolate. "Again she sends out a wireless lament: 'I am heartbroken. It is too bad. They have blundered.' And the only help Tino could give his friends was to promise Hindenburg on January 10, 1917, that rather than allow the Peloponnese to fall into the hands of the Allies he would destroy them. This was followed by a charmingly intimate note to the Kaiser on January 17:

Despatch of their Majesties King Constantine and Queen Sophie to Mr. N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin:

"We send you from the bottom of our heart our cordial wishes for your birthday. We follow with admiration the great events by land and sea. May God soon give you a glorious victory over all your infamous enemies. They have honored us by the landing of forty Senegalese soldiers in order to guard the Legation of France. A charming picture of civilization! Affectionate greetings.

TINO.

SOPHIE."

Venizelos Eagerly Pro-Ally.

To follow in some measure the conflict revealed in the pages of this White Book between the court at Athens and the statesman Venizelos, to whom Greece owed and owes her national unity, it must be remembered that Venizelos, who controlled the majority of the Greek Parliament at

the outbreak of the war in 1914, was eagerly in favor of the Entente, while the German trained King, on the other hand, was stubbornly against siding with France and her allies. King Constantine had studied at the Berlin War College; he looked up to the Kaiser as a demigod, and when in 1913 he toured Europe after the Balkan war he showed his contempt for France by openly ascribing the victories the Greek armies had gained to the training he and his officers had received in Germany—altogether forgetful of the fact that the officers of his army owed whatever military science they had to the care and devotion of a Frenchman, Gen. Eyraud, to whom, with his staff of French officers, had been entrusted the building-up of the Greek army before the Balkan war by the late King George of Greece.

Constantine had not always been the idol of his own army. Early in his career there was a certain "concentration at the rear," to put it euphemistically, about the time of the battle of Larissa, that had caused the word "coward" to be associated with his name in the officers' mess. The common soldier also had strong feelings on the point. The man in the ranks remembered that the Crown Prince was fond of the table, that his field kitchen was always liberally supplied when other haversacks were empty, and that whenever he moved toward the front a liberal quantity of ducks was always taken along to meet his royal needs. For many years after that Greece-Turkish war they showed their resentment by shouting "Quack quack!" as his carriage drove by. The crowning disgrace came in 1903, when the Military League demanded the removal of the Prince from the command of the army.

He Regains Popularity.

It was then that Constantine, almost an exile, returned to study military in Berlin. He had his reward when the Kaiser made him a Field Marshal of the Prussian army. A measure of glory came his way in the late Balkan war when, owing to rivalries in the Supreme Command, he was allowed to capture Janina and was thereupon hailed as a new Napoleon throughout Greece. The murder of his father, King George, at Salonica soon after-

ward placed him on the throne at the height of his popularity. Imagination plays a large part in the life of a people, and, flushed with victory over the Turks and Bulgars, the ambitious Greeks in 1913 were looking toward Constantinople. It would not be too much to say that they held Constantine to be a chosen leader and that his military feats were but the forerunners of higher greatness. There is a quality that doth hedge a king, and the name of King Constantine XII (the Greeks have long memories!) was popular in Greece as one that foretold the freeing of Santa Sophia from the Moslem.

Such, then, was the handicap of Venizelos. As the war went on the German victories and the allied disaster at Gallipoli were all too familiar to the people of the Levant. Venizelos was eager to aid in the Gallipoli enterprise. The King called a crown council and opposed intervention, and Venizelos resigned for the first time in March, 1915. The people were bewildered. The King caused it to be spread abroad that Venizelos was willing to surrender Greek territory in order to win Bulgaria over to the Entente. Venizelos called on the Cabinet to deny this and published his own memorandum, showing the offers made to him by the Entente. The great statesman maintained that his one object was harmony in the Balkan friendship with Bulgaria and a greater Greece, until he learned that Germany had made a loan to Bulgaria, wherein he read the handwriting on the wall. The King repudiated this explanation. Elections were held in June and the Venizelos party sent back to the Chamber by a large majority, while the King was forced to accept once more Venizelos and his policy of benevolent neutrality to the Entente and the fulfillment of treaty obligations to Serbia.

A new crisis arose in September, when Bulgaria mobilized against Serbia. Venizelos ordered Greek mobilization and asked France and England to send 150,000 troops to support Serbia.

The King refused to give his consent, and Venizelos communicated this refusal to the Entente Powers. The French, however, had already landed at Salonica, and other troops were on



GEN SARRAÏL



SKOULOUDIS

the way. It became a question of the King or the Premier whom the people had elected, and once more the Premier resigned. The new Premier, Zaimis, lasted only a month in office, but during that month Bulgaria attacked Serbia, and Greece refused to live up to her treaty obligations, failed to honor her bond, declared herself bankrupt in faith and devoid of credit at the word of Constantine and his German Queen.

People's Will Overridden.

Zaimis was succeeded by Skouloudis, a creature of the King, as the majority of the Parliament was strongly Venizelist. The issue at stake was whether to allow the Anglo-French force to remain on Greek soil, and as the Parliament opposed the policy of the Cabinet the King dissolved the Chamber in November and called for new elections. Venizelos refused to recognize the King's right, and declaring that Constantine had violated the constitution, called on his followers not to vote, and at the polls in December the King's favorites were of necessity in the majority. The King had once more overridden the will of the people. The new Cabinet had as Premier and Foreign Minister this same Skouloudis whose name is associated with so many of the documents in the new Greek White Book. His policy was one of favoring the Bulgars and Germans at every turn. No sooner was he reestablished in power than his plans became known to the army, where they caused consternation, the proverbial hate of the Greek and Bulgar being intensified after the recent Balkan war. Document after document, signed by Yanakistas, the new Minister of War, instructed the commanders to retreat before the Bulgar advance, to give up forts and supplies and to avoid offence, until we come to the extraordinary surrender of Fort Roupel, receipt for which was given by Capt. Thiel of the German army:

Protocol of the Surrender of Fort Roupel.

(Translation.)

Fort Roupel, May 14-27, 1916.

The commander of the fort, John Mavroudis, has surrendered the fort to the German Cavalry (Capt. Thiel) with the following material and supplies:

- (1) Two guns of 15 cm.
- (2) Two guns of 7.5 cm. with 800 shells.
- (3) 1,200,000 cartridges.
- (4) 6,800 kilos of biscuits.
- (5) 350 kilos of sugar.
- (6) 150 kilos of butter.

as well as other provisions.

THIEL,

Commander of Infantry.

*The present protocol was drawn up in Germany.

Skouloudis Explains.

This surrender caused such bitter feeling in the allied capitals that Mr. Skouloudis was forced to explain to his ministers abroad.

Events now began to move rapidly in Athens. The palace was alarmed. Prince Nicholas and Prince Andrew were sent to London and Petrograd, as it was explained to Berlin, to convince the courts there that the policy of the Allies in Greece was undermining the throne. Berlin approved, and Theotoky in Berlin, reporting to King Constantine, added that he told von Bernstorff "that this step by no means altered the political orientation, your Majesty had to this was a purely personal matter. Athens was not relaxed. The Queen's Master of Ceremonies warned Berlin that to send wireless messages addressed to the King was dangerous, but to use instead two W's as initials.

By May the financial situation was in a bad way. The Skouloudis Cabinet was reeking up and a new Minister of Finance had to be called in to face a deficit of 350,000,000 francs. The Bleichroeder Bank had promised 40,000,000 marks in July. In November this same bank was asked by wireless to place 10,000,000 marks on deposit in New York.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Royal Legation at Rome.

ATHENS, Nov. 1-14, 1916.

Please send by mail the following despatch to our Minister Resident at Bern, in order that it may be telegraphed to Mr. Theotoky.

Despatch of G. Christaki-Tzopoulos, associate governor of the National Bank of Greece, to N. Theotoky, Minister of Greece at Berlin:

Please transmit to the Bleichroeder Bank the following despatch of the National Bank of Greece: "I have received your letter of July 18. I beg you, debiting our account, to place at our disposal at the best rates the equivalent of ten million marks, in dollars, as a first case bank of your choice in New York, indicating to us the name of the bank through the Legation as intermediary."

ZOGRAFIOS.

The reply came in December from Berlin:

P. S. N. Theotoky for the National Bank of Greece:

Mr. Bleichroeder informs me that with his regret and notwithstanding all his efforts, it has not been possible, for technical reasons, to have the national bank credited at a New York bank with counter value for the ten million marks, exchange being too much restricted.

THEOTOKY.

Used the Bern Route.

However, Queen Sophie managed to keep up a communication with Berlin through the Greek Minister at Bern. Meanwhile the Venizelist party assumed new strength; appeals were made to the Cretan to save the nation and the troops were able to defend their soil against the Bulgars. In June Skouloudis had resigned and Zaimis was again called in. But the Allies insisted on Greek demobilization for fear of treachery. In December the Allies demanded that Greece turn over her heavy artillery. This was refused and the French landed in Athens. A Greek officer lost his head

Continued on Following Page.